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The popularly accepted version of the evacuation of the Japanese 
Canadians from the Pacific Coast in 1941-1942 and the background to 
it runs roughly like this. The white population of British Columbia had 
long cherished resentments against the Asians who lived among them, 
and most particularly against the Japanese Canadians. Much of this 
sprang from envy of the Japanese Canadians' hard-work and industry, 
much at the substantial share held by Japanese Canadians of the 
fishing, market gardening and lumbering industry. Moreover, white 
British Columbians (and Canadians generally) had long had fears that 
the Japanese Canadians were unassimilable into Canadian society and, 
beginning early in this century and intensifying as the interwar period 
wore on, that many might secretly be acting as agents of their original 
homeland, now an aggressive and expansionist Japan. Liberal and 
Conservative politicians at the federal, provincial and municipal levels 
played upon the racist fears of the majority for their own political 
purposes. Thus when the Second World War began in September 1939, 
and when its early course ran disastrously against the Allies, there was 
already substantial fear about "aliens" in British Columbia (and 
elsewhere) and a desire to ensure that Japanese Canadians would be 
exempted from military training and service. The federal government 
concurred in this, despite the desire of many young Japanese Canadians 
to show their loyalty to Canada by enlisting. 
After 7 December 1941 and the beginning of the Pacific War, public 
and political pressures upon the Japanese Canadians increased 
exponentially. Suspected subversives were rounded up by the R C M P in 
the first hours of the war, and over the next ten weeks a variety of 
actions took place that resulted in the seizure of fishing vessels, arms, 
cars, cameras, radio transmitters and short-wave receivers owned by 
Japanese Canadians, and then escalated through the evacuation from 
the coast of male Japanese nationals between the ages of 18 and 45 to 
the removal of all Japanese, whether Canadian citizens by birth or 
naturalization and regardless of age or sex, into the interior. The 
legalized theft of the property of these Japanese Canadians then 
followed, and even before the war ended the government moved to 
deport large numbers to Japan. These events occurred despite the facts 
that the R C M P and Canada's senior military officers considered the 
removal of the Japanese from the coast unnecessary, there being no 
credible military or security threat; that the responsible politicians in 
Ottawa, and particularly Ian Mackenzie, BC's representative in the 
Cabinet, knew that the Japanese Canadians posed no threat to national 
security and acted out of a desire to pander to the bigotry of some 
whites or for political motives relating to the conduct of the war at 
home. 
This bald summary is based on such books as Ken Adachi's The 
Enemy that Never Was (Toronto, 1976), the second volume of Hugh 
Keenleyside's Memoirs (Toronto, 1982), and Ann Gomer Sunahara's 
The Politics of Racism (Toronto, 1981), as well as on the National 
Association of Japanese Canadians' brief to the federal government, 
Democracy Betrayed: The Case for Redress (1985). There are 
variations of emphasis in these accounts, naturally enough, but the 
received version is a composite that does not pay much attention to 
these differences. 
That Canadians should be interested in the events of 1942 is 
understandable. That they should attempt to fix blame for the events of 
those days is no less so, and historians, whose trade obliges them to 
rummage with more or less science through the past, have not been 
immune from this tendency. It is the responsibility of historians, 
however, to try to put themselves back into the circumstances of the 
past and, while never becoming apologists for the horrors of those times, 
to seek to understand why people acted as they did. This paper is an 
attempt to do precisely that, and to look afresh at some points which are 
encompassed in the received version of the 1942 evacuation and open 
for examination and some which are not. 
The Intelligence Services 
The first question that must be raised, and one that has not been 
asked before, is this: what resources did Ottawa's civil, military and 
police authorities have on the West Coast before the outbreak of war to 
secure information about the 22,000 Japanese Canadians living in 
British Columbia? The answer is readily available. 
The responsibility for internal security rested with the RCMP, 
assisted as necessary by the armed forces.1 In July 1941, five months 
before the outbreak of war with Japan, the RCMP's " E " Division 
responsible for the Pacific Coast had on its staff three persons 
concerned with gathering intelligence on the Japanese Canadians in 
British Columbia: a sergeant who did not speak Japanese, a constable 
who did, and a civilian translator. These three were in charge of the 
"active personnel intelligence work on enemy and potential enemy 
aliens and agents." There was, in addition, a lieutenant-commander at 
Naval Headquarters in Esquimalt charged with intelligence duties who 
was "greatly interested in the Japanese problem generally," but who 
had many other tasks. The Royal Canadian Air Force's intelligence 
section in the province, which like the Royal Canadian Navy's had a 
wide range of duties over and above collecting information on Japanese 
Canadians, consisted of two officers, both of whom had lived in Japan 
and spoke Japanese. The senior officer, a Squadron Leader Wynd, 
however, could read Japanese only with difficulty: whether his colleague 
was any more fluent is uncertain. The army's intelligence on the coast 
was in the hands of two very busy officers, neither of whom spoke 
Japanese. In addition, the British Columbia Provincial Police had four 
officers working in the Japanese-Canadian community. Cooperation 
between the various services was hampered by RCMP regulations that 
forbade the Mounties to share information with their colleagues without 
first securing permission from Ottawa headquarters. Even so, the West 
Coast Joint Intelligence Committee had been created to coordinate the 
information collected by the military and police.2 There is one 
additional point worth mentioning: the British intelligence services had 
some representation on the West Coast, and there exists in RCMP files 
one very long (and very inflammatory) report on "Japanese Activities in 
British Columbia," prepared by someone unnamed for William 
Stephenson's British Security Coordination. 3 
This intelligence presence did not amount to very much. As Hugh 
Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs, a British Colum­
bian who had served in the Legation in Japan and who was genuinely 
sympathetic to the Japanese Canadians, wrote in June 1940, there was a 
danger of subversive activities on the part of some elements in the 
Japanese community. "The police," he went on, "are not in a position to 
ferret out the dangerous Japanese as they have done with the Germans 
and Italians; they have lines on a few Japanese who might be expected 
to take part in attempts at sabotage.... But that would not really solve 
the problem." 4 Even, therefore, in the view of someone in a position to 
know (and understand), the intelligence information gathered on the 
Japanese Canadians was strictly limited, the officers involved patheti­
cally few in number and largely baffled by the impenetrability of the 
Japanese language and the tendency of the Japanese Canadians to stay 
together, separate, and (with good historical reasons) not to trust 
whites. 
The discussion thus far has said nothing about the quality of the 
information gathered. The available intelligence evidence on the 
Japanese Canadians is very slim (and the Privacy Act prevents us from 
seeing whatever else there might be), but we can state with confidence 
that when the RCMP looked at Communist questions, towards which it 
had a definite idee fixe, or the activities of suspected Nazis in this 
period, its work was far from competent. 5 In November 1939, J .W. 
Pickersgil! of the prime minister's office complained that the force could 
not distinguish between facts and hearsay, or discriminate between 
legitimate social and political criticism and subversive doctrine. There 
was, moreover, "no suggestion that there is any co-ordination with 
Military Intelligence, or with the Immigration authorities, or with the 
Department of External Affairs, or even with the Censorship." More 
disturbing still to Pickersgill was "the evidence of a total lack of the 
capacity, education and training required for real intelligence work...." 6 
Whether the RCMP's efforts on the Japanese Canadians were any 
better remains speculative, at least until all the files are open to 
research; the existing documents offer no grounds for optimism. 
There is little more information available on the quality of military 
intelligence gathered. But as the regular forces before the war were tiny 
and as military intelligence, a skill requiring years of preparation, was 
not among the best-developed areas of the permanent forces, there is no 
reason to believe that the army, navy or air force by 1941 were any less 
clumsy or more sophisticated in their ability to gather and assess 
information on the Japanese Canadians than the RCMP. Evidence for 
this conclusion is suggested by the efforts of the Examination Unit, a 
secret operation of External Affairs and National Defence set up under 
the shelter of the National Research Council, among other things to 
attempt to decipher Japanese diplomatic and military wireless messages 
in response to a British request before Pearl Harbor. As the just 
declassified manuscript history of the Examination Unit notes, two 
people were engaged for this purpose in August 1941, a Mr. and Mrs. 
T.L. Colton. "It was hoped that Mrs. Colton, who was very well 
educated in Japanese but could not handle translation into English, 
might be able to explain the contents of messages to her husband who 
could then write them out in English. This system," the history notes 
dryly, "did not prove very satisfactory" and the Coltons were replaced 
in April 1942. 7 
In this atmosphere of improvisation and amateurism, many of the 
available reports by the R C M P and the military on the Japanese 
Canadians tended to focus on investigations of alleged "unlawful 
drilling [with weapons]" by male Japanese Canadians, reports of caches 
of Japanese rifles and ammunition, and accounts of suspicious fishing 
parties of well-dressed Japanese who did not appear to be fishermen. 
Rumours, plain and fanciful.8 On the other hand, there were just as 
many assertions offered with great confidence that 95 percent of 
Japanese Canadians were law abiding and satisfied with their lot in 
Canada and that "No fear of sabotage need be expected from the 
Japanese in Canada." That last statement by Assistant Commissioner 
Frederick J. Mead of the RCMP, one of the Mounties' specialists in 
security matters and Communist subversion, was, he added, "broad 
[but] at the same time I know it to be true." 9 
Mead was soon a member of the British Columbia Security 
Commission where, activist Nisei (or second generation Canadian 
Japanese) correctly believed, he depended on intelligence from Etsuji 
Morii, a man suspected of blackmailing other Japanese Canadians and 
a notorious underworld figure. Morii was in turn the Commission's 
appointed chairman of the "Japanese Liaison Committee," whose 
mandate was to convey news and information in 1942 to the commu­
nity. 1 0 As Mead was the senior R C M P official on the coast early in 
1942, he was almost certainly the main source for R C M P Commis­
sioner S.T. Wood's defence of Morii and his assertion to William 
Stephenson (in response to the British Security Coordination report 
mentioned earlier) in August 1942 that "we have searched without let-
up for evidence detrimental to the interests of the state and we feel that 
our coverage has been good, but to date no such evidence has been 
uncovered."" The RCMP's firmly-stated position may have been 
correct, but again the small size of its resources and the lack of 
sophistication of all its operations in this period tend to raise doubts. 
From 45 years distance, the fairest thing that can be said is that the 
R C M P had uncovered relatively little hard information about possible 
subversion among the Japanese Canadians before 7 December 1941, if 
there were indeed subversive intentions within the community, because 
it lacked the competence and skills to do so. Moreover, much of the 
information that the R C M P had before and after that date came from 
sources that even many Japanese Canadians considered self-interested 
and tainted. 
The Role of the Japanese Consulate 
Such intelligence information as there was tended to agree that the 
Japanese Consulate in Vancouver was the focus of Japanese national­
ism, propaganda and possible subversive activities in BC. One R C M P 
report surveying the general activities of the Japanese Canadians noted 
that the Consul and his staff regularly visited areas where Japanese 
Canadians lived to deliver speeches and to talk privately with individu­
als about the Tokyo government's views of world events. One R C A F 
intelligence officer was sufficiently alarmed by these activities to tell his 
superior that he considered British Columbia's Japanese Canadians to 
be "directly under the control of the Japanese Government through 
their consul at Vancouver." 1 2 The Consul was also thought to exercise 
considerable influence on the local Japanese language schools and press. 
Roles of these sorts, of course, were well within the bounds of 
diplomatic niceties. And since, under Japanese law, Nisei born abroad 
before 1924 were considered as Imperial subjects, while those born 
abroad after that date could register at Japanese consulates and secure 
Japanese citizenship in addition to their status as British subjects, the 
Consul in Vancouver had substantial work to do in dealing with the 
approximately 7,200 Japanese nationals, 2,400 naturalized British 
subjects, and the unknown (but very large) number of Japanese 
Canadians holding dual citizenship in the BC community. 1 3 A military 
intelligence paper surveying the situation on the coast added that the 
Consul "through his agents, and through the Japanese schoolmasters, 
and the Japanese patriotic societies cultivates a strong Japanese spirit 
and a consciousness among the BC Japanese of being 'sons of Japan 
abroad' rather than Canadian citizens." 1 4 That was no different than 
the role of the Italian and German consuls in this pre-war period. 
There were, however, grounds for believing that in this instance the 
Japanese Consulate's officials had duties of a more dangerous kind. On 
28 February 1941, Vincent Massey, the high commissioner in London, 
reported to Prime Minister Mackenzie King that "reliable information 
of a most secret character" had revealed that "official Japanese circles" 
were taking great interest in the British Columbia Coast. "Reference is 
also made to large number of Japanese settled in British Columbia and 
on Western Coast of United States, who are all said to have their 
duties," 1 5 an ominous phrase. 
The source of that information was possibly Britain's Government 
Code & Cypher School which had been reading some Japanese military 
and diplomatic messages since the 1920s, 1 6 or more probably "Magic," 
the name given by the Americans to their armed forces' decryption 
operation that in January 1941 had cracked the "Purple" code used for 
the most secret Japanese diplomatic traffic. Britain and the United 
States soon started to cooperate in reading Japanese codes, and by the 
spring of 1941 the two countries had pooled their intelligence." The 
Americans also began reading their hitherto unbroken files of Japanese 
messages back to 1938. 
The decryption team had intercepted important telegrams from the 
Foreign Office in Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington dated 
30 January 1941, which gave the Gaimusho's orders to its officials in 
North America to de-emphasize propaganda and to strengthen 
intelligence gathering. Special reference was made to "Utilization of 
our 'Second Generations' [Nisei] and our resident nationals" and to the 
necessity for great caution so as not to bring persecution down on their 
heads. Those messages were copied to Ottawa and Vancouver as 
"Minister's orders" — instructions, in other words, that were to be 
carried out in Canada just as in the United States. The Consulate's 
success in carrying out these orders remains unknown. 
A further message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 15 February 
1941, was also sent to Ottawa and Vancouver as a "Minister's 
instruction." In this telegram, the Foreign Ministry specified the 
"information we particularly desire with regard to intelligence involving 
US and Canada," especially the strengthening of Pacific Coast 
defences, ship and aircraft movements. In a telegram the day before, the 
Consulate in Vancouver was instructed to pay special attention to 
paragraph 10 of the order to Washington: "General outlooks on Alaska 
and the Aleutian Islands, with particular stress on items involving plane 
movements and shipment of military supplies to those localities." The 
next month, the Consulate was asked to report on R C N ship move­
ments. Whether these particular telegrams were the basis for Massey's 
despatch to Ottawa is unclear. 1 8 
A thorough search of the "Magic" intercepts in the United States 
National Archives makes clear that at least as early as 1939 intelligence 
and counter-intelligence work was carried on from the Vancouver 
Consulate, exactly as was taking place in the Japanese Consulates all 
over the United States and throughout the Western Hemisphere. As we 
have seen, the 1941 telegrams also stress efforts to involve the resident 
nationals and the second generation Nisei, at whom radio broadcasts 
from Tokyo had been deliberately aimed for some years. How much, if 
anything, Ottawa knew of all this, beyond the RCMP's suspicions and 
the information conveyed in the Massey telegram, is still indeterminate. 
But surely there was ample justification in the light of the Massey 
telegram for the government to have increased surveillance on the 
Consulate and the Japanese-Canadian community. There is no sign that 
it did so." 
One contemporary assessment of the Canadian situation by an R C A F 
intelligence officer noted that "espionage and subversive activity is 
largely carried on by a few key Japanese working under the Consul and 
seriously involves only a few — say 60 at most — Japanese 
individuals." This same officer then tried to assess the response of 
Japanese Canadians in the event of war, particularly if the Japanese 
authorities instructed them to engage in sabotage, and if such orders 
were reinforced by "disorderly demonstrations of white antipathy." His 
answer was that "No one knows; but no one in his senses would take a 
chance on Japanese loyalty under those circumstances." 2 0 
The Pre- War Pro-Japan Actions of Japanese Canadians 
If that sounds harsh, there were reasons why it should not. Through­
out the 1930s and especially after 1937, Japan had aggressively 
expanded its influences in northern China, and the Imperial Japanese 
Army had campaigned with great brutality in that country. The 
Japanese government, naturally enough, tried to put the best face 
possible on its actions, and it encouraged the creation and spread of 
propaganda on its behalf abroad, something in which Japanese 
Canadians directly assisted by writing and distributing leaflets. The 
most widely distributed pamphlet, dated 1 October 1937 and published 
by the Canadian Japanese Association, the largest Japanese-Canadian 
association with over 3,000 members, was "Sino-Japanese Conflict 
Elucidated," a far from unbiased examination of the struggle in China, 
despite its claim to be circulated "in the interests of truth, to meet 
unfair and untrue propaganda." Moreover, money, comforts for the 
troops, medical supplies and tin foil were collected for Japan by first 
generation Issei and second generation Nisei groups. 2 1 There was, of 
course, nothing remotely improper about this, and other ethnic groups 
in Canada at that time (Italians, say, during the Italo-Ethiopian war) 
and more recently (Jews during the Arab-Israeli wars, for example) 
have acted similarly in comparable circumstances. 
But the wholly justifiable outrage in Canada over such incidents as 
the brutal rape of Nanking, with its estimated 200,000 or more dead 
(and Japanese army assaults on Canadian missionaries stationed there) 
led many Canadians to boycott Japanese products and to call upon the 
federal government to take steps to cease strategic metal exports to 
Japan. Such measures were eventually taken. 2 2 And the New Canadian, 
the newspaper of British Columbia's Nisei, began publication in late 
1938, noted its founder, Edward Ouchi, the General Secretary of the 
main Nisei organization, the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League, to 
counter the "vicious" anti-Japanese propaganda of North American 
Chinese that was hurting Japanese-Canadian businesses. Although the 
newspaper did not offer frequent support for Japan's war in China in its 
pages, it did give close and favourable coverage to the activities of the 
Consul in Vancouver and even ran an occasional rotogravure section of 
propagandistic photographs on life in Japan. 2 1 
Inevitably Japanese-Canadian support for Japan's war on China 
focussed much attention upon the Issei and Nisei. As Professor Henry 
Angus of the University of British Columbia wrote in October 1940: 
T h e young Japanese unders tand the position well enough. At first they (in all 
good faith I th ink) distr ibuted a good deal of pro-Japanese , ant i -Chinese 
propaganda . N o w they say, "we are not responsible for what Japan may d o . " I 
tell them that they have unfor tunate ly made people feel that they are 
identified with J apan by their action in dis t r ibut ing propaganda , and that it is 
very difficult to find a way of removing this impression. 2 J 
Angus was always very sympathetic to the Japanese Canadians (and 
after he had joined External Affairs, he and Hugh Keenleyside would 
find themselves under attack in Parliament because of the vigor of their 
resistance to the evacuation in January and February 1942), 2 5 but he 
was surely correct in his assessment. Even such supportive British 
Columbia politicians as CCF Member of Parliament Angus Maclnnis 
agreed. 2 6 The Japanese Canadians by their support for Japan "impaired 
[their] standing with those circles most disposed to press [their] cause," 
Professor Angus lamented. 2 7 
We can say today that Canadians should have understood the 
difficulties that a small minority would have faced in not supporting its 
belligerent mother country in those days in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. But after the Pearl Harbor attack and the fall of Hong Kong, 
British Columbians, already predisposed to expect the worst of the 
Japanese Canadians and motivated by deep-rooted racism against them, 
and Canadians generally could not reasonably have been expected to 
make such judgements. Many Japanese Canadians had supported Japan 
against China before 7 December and few, if any, had opposed her; 
after Pearl Harbor, China was an ally and Japan an enemy. Therefore, 
the supporters of Japan before 7 December were now supporters of 
Canada's enemy and possibly (or probably) disloyal, particularly as 
there seemed no way of distinguishing the active few from the passive 
majority. The syllogism was flawed (and certainly the vast majority of 
German and Italian Canadians had been treated far differently in the 
comparable circumstances of September 1939 and June 1940), but few 
were prepared to challenge its logic. 
Norman Robertson, the under secretary of state for external affairs, a 
British Columbian and no bigot, expressed something of the same 
reasoning when he told Pierrepont Moffat, the American minister to 
Canada, on 8 December 1941 that "the Government had hoped not to 
have to intern all Japanese. However, this might be very difficult in view 
of the treacherous nature of the Japanese attack, [and] the evidences of 
premeditation...." 2 8 Robertson's description of the attack mirrored the 
public's response: "In the wake of Pearl Harbor, the single word 
favoured by Americans as best characterizing the Japanese people," 
John Dower has noted, "was 'treacherous' ...." 2 9 
The Attitudes of Japanese Canadians After 7 December 
In August 1944, Prime Minister King told the House of Commons 
that "no person of Japanese race born in Canada has been charged with 
any act of sabotage or disloyalty during the years of war." In his 
account, Ken Adachi added that "no alien Japanese or naturalized 
citizen had ever been found guilty of the same crime." 3 0 Those 
statements are undoubtedly true, but they do not tell the whole story. 
Thirty-seven or 38 Japanese nationals were arrested and interned by 
the RCMP at the outbreak of the war, presumably because they were 
thought to be engaged in espionage or subversive activities. None of the 
standard accounts offers any detailed information on the allegations 
against or the fate of these people. 3 1 
More important, it seems certain that support for Japan remained 
strong among some Japanese Canadians after the war began. The Issei 
Takeo Nakano, in his book Within the Barbed Wire Fence, notes that 
"We Japanese, largely working-class immigrants, were, generally 
speaking, not given to sophisticated political thinking. Rather we had in 
common a blind faith in Japan's eventual victory." John J. Stephan's 
study, Hawaii Under the Rising Sun, cites the conclusions of Japanese 
historians Nobuhiro Adachi and Hidehiko Ushijima that most first-
generation Japanese in Hawaii remained loyal to Japan: "even among 
those who considered the Pearl Harbor attack a betrayal were many 
who believed in and hoped for an ultimate Japanese victory.... Radio 
reports of Japanese advances ... confirmed for many their motherland's 
invincibility." Nakano's book demonstrates that the same response 
existed in British Columbia, and even Sunahara notes that the Japanese 
vice-consul encouraged some Japanese Canadians to seek internment as 
a gesture of support for Japan ." Those of Japanese origin, of course, 
formed a greater proportion of the Hawaiian population (about 35 
percent) than did the Japanese Canadians in British Columbia (about 
three percent). Moreover, at this point it is impossible to determine if 
the links between the Japanese Canadians and Japan were stronger or 
weaker than those between Hawaiian Japanese and the mother country. 
These two factors could certainly have affected the situation. 
Nakano also underlines the presence in the Japanese-Canadian 
community of a substantial number of hard-liners or gambariya, "best 
described as rebels against the treatment they were receiving in time of 
war. The Nisei gambariya were protesting such unjust treatment of 
Canadian citizens," he continues, an understandable response. He goes 
on, however, to note that "the Issei gambariya firmly believed in 
Japan's eventual victory and looked forward to the Canadian govern­
ment's enforced compensation to them." 3 3 That attitude is less 
understandable if the revised version is to be accepted. More than 750 
gambariya, a fairly substantial number of the approximately 9,000 
adult males over the age of sixteen in a BC community of 22,000, were 
interned at Angler in Northern Ontario, and Nakano, in part as a result 
of misunderstanding, he says, ended up there as well. Nakano's story is 
stylistically elliptical, but it rings true. None of the historical accounts 
make much mention of the gambariya, other than to skirt the evidence 
by saying that there were some who refused to have anything to do with 
the evacuation or to cooperate with the Canadian authorities. 
Perhaps a last word here should belong to Stephan, whose study of 
Hawaii is an exemplary and sensitive one. "It has been common to write 
about Hawaii's Japanese before and during the Second World War as if 
their 'loyalty' were a self-evident, quantifiable phenomenon," he said. 
"In the justifiable impulse to indict the relocation of West Coast 
Japanese and Japanese Americans ... writers have in many cases dealt 
simplistically with what is full of complex nuances and ambiguities." 3 4 
Those comments apply with equal force to the Canadian accounts, 
almost all of which have been remarkably one-dimensional. 
The Role of the Military in the Evacuation 
There is no doubt that senior officers of the armed forces and the 
R C M P in Ottawa were remarkably unperturbed by the presence of 
large numbers of Japanese Canadians in British Columbia. 3 5 General 
Maurice Pope, the vice chief of the General Staff, attended the 
Conference on the Japanese Problem in British Columbia in Ottawa on 
8-9 January 1942, which brought together representatives from British 
Columbia, the federal bureaucracy, and political figures, and his 
memoir provides the standard account. The navy, he wrote, had no 
fears, now that the Japanese-Canadian fishing fleet was in secure hands; 
the R C M P expressed no concern, and Pope himself, offering the army 
position, said that if the R C M P was not perturbed, "neither was the 
Army." Pope adds that several days after the meeting adjourned, the 
angry and frightened British Columbians who had attended "must have 
got busy on the telephone" for "we received an urgent message from the 
[Army's] Pacific Command recommending positive action against the 
Japanese in the interests of national security. With the receipt of this 
message, completely reversing the Command's previous stand," the 
minister of national defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston, "was anything but 
pleased." 3 6 
The evidence simply does not support Pope's account. While it is clear 
that the Department of National Defence's representatives on the 
Special Committee on Measures to be Taken in the Event of War With 
Japan agreed in mid-1941 with the Committee's recommendation to 
Cabinet that "the bulk of the Japanese population in Canada can 
continue its normal activities," 3 7 and while it is equally certain in mid-
December the Chiefs of Staff Committee told the Cabinet War 
Committee that fears of a Japanese assault on BC were unwarranted, 3 8 
there is absolutely no doubt that the military commanders in British 
Columbia and the military members of the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence were seriously concerned about the possible threat posed by the 
Japanese-Canadian population both before and after 7 December 1941. 
The real question that remains unanswered is why in this instance the 
generals, admirals and air marshals in Ottawa were so ready to ignore 
the advice of their commanders in the field. 
Certainly the military advice from BC was completely unambiguous. 
The Joint Service Committee, Pacific Coast, the key coordinating 
military body that brought together the three service commanders in 
British Columbia, had prepared plans in July 1940 for preventive 
actions directed at the Japanese Canadians in the event of war with 
Japan. 3 ' The Committee also recommended on 17 June 1941 that "the 
Japanese population [of approximately 230] residing in the vicinity of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force Advanced Base at Ucluelet [on the West 
Coast of Vancouver Island] should, in the event of an emergency, be 
evacuated for reasons of security. It was felt that similar steps should be 
taken in connection with Japanese resident near other important 
defence areas, and particularly those established near air bases." There 
were about two hundred Japanese Canadians living at Port Alice near 
the Coal Harbour RCAF base and the same number in Prince Rupert 
near another air station. The Committee's recommendations had been 
forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa no later than 20 
September 1941. 4 0 
In addition, the RCN on the coast had long been concerned with the 
fleet of up to 1,200 fishing vessels operated by Japanese Canadians. In 
1937, for example, the Navy's staff officer (intelligence) at Esquimalt 
had said that "The fact that there are a large number of Japanese 
fishermen operating in British Columbia waters ... and having a 
thorough and practical knowledge of the coast, is in itself a matter of 
some concern to the Naval authorities." 4 1 In August 1941, the naval 
officer commanding on the coast asked Ottawa for authority to round 
up the fishing boats in the event of war. The Department of External 
Affairs refused to agree to this in toto, however, and in October orders 
were issued for seizure only of boats "owned and operated by Japanese 
nationals." "Vessels owned and operated by British subjects of Japanese 
origin," the RCN was told, "will only be interfered with where there are 
positive grounds for suspicion, comparable to those which would justify 
the internment of a British subject of Japanese origin." 4 2 When war 
came five weeks later, those orders would be overridden in the urgency 
of the moment. 
Furthermore, before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, both the 
Canadians and the Americans worried about the concentration of 
Japanese Americans and Canadians living along the common coastline. 
The Joint Service Committee, Pacific Coast, had urged Ottawa on 20 
September 1941 to coordinate any actions with Washington. In its 
opinion, "inequality in the treatment of persons of Japanese race in the 
territories of the Dominion of Canada and the United States would be 
liable to prove a source of danger to the effective prosecution of such 
measures of control as may be ordered by either government and to 
furnish grounds for grievance by the persons immediately concerned." 4 3 
The Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its meeting on 10-11 
November at Montreal had also considered the question of the 
"population of Japanese racial origin." Just as the Joint Service 
Committee on the West Coast had urged, the Canadian and American 
members agreed that there should be consultation to produce "policies 
of a similar character in relation to these racial groups" if war with 
Japan broke out. The aim was "a practicable coincidence of policy." 4 4 
That did not imply evacuation from the Pacific Coast, but it did suggest 
that there was a shared realization of a "problem." And as John 
Hickerson, the senior State Department official regularly concerned 
with Canadian affairs, noted after that PJBD meeting, it would "cause 
the Canadians considerable political difficulty in British Columbia if we 
adopted more rigid treatment of Japanese in California than that 
prescribed in British Columbia." That, he added, is why the Canadians 
suggest "that at the proper time there be consultation" between the two 
governments "with the view to adopting similar policies in Canada and 
in continental United States." 4 5 
After Pearl Harbor, but before the Conference in Ottawa, the three 
senior officers on the coast wrote to Ottawa with their views. Major-
General R.O. Alexander, the GOC of Pacific Command, told the chief 
of the General Staff on 30 December that he believed "internment of 
Japanese males between the ages of 18 and 45, their removal from the 
coast and their organization into paid units on public works ... would be 
advisable." Such action, Alexander added, "might prevent inter-racial 
riots and bloodshed, and will undoubtedly do a great deal to calm the 
local population." There is no doubt that General Pope saw this letter, 
because he sent a copy of it to Hugh Keenleyside of the Department of 
External Affairs and Keenleyside wrote back to him with suggestions on 
3 January — before the "Japanese Problem" conference in Ottawa took 
place.'1 6 
The senior RCAF officer in BC shared the view of his army 
colleague. Air Commodore L.F. Stevenson informed RCAF headquar­
ters in Ottawa on 2 January that security "cannot rest on precarious 
discernment between those who would actively support Japan and those 
who might at present be apathetic." If the government had doubts about 
the wisdom of moving the Japanese out, Stevenson said, "I suggest a 
strong commission be appointed immediately to ... obtain the opinion of 
a good cross section of the BC public and the officers charged with the 
defence of the Pacific Coast." The senior naval officer agreed, 
Commodore W.J.R. Beech telling his headquarters on 27 December 
that "Public opinion is very much against the Japanese all over the 
Queen Charlotte Islands and in view of the strategic position of these 
Islands I would strongly recommend that all the Japanese be 
removed." 4 ' 
All three officers stressed public opinion at least as much as military 
needs, and it is reasonable to assume that their positions often put them 
in close contact with politicians and journalists likely to be pressing for 
stern action. But this does not alter the fact that the responsible military 
commanders in British Columbia, after 7 December and before the 
Ottawa conference, called for removal of the Japanese Canadians from 
all or part of the coastal region; so too had their staffs urged removal 
before 7 December from the vicinity of military bases and after Pearl 
Harbor from coastal areas of the province. 4 8 Moreover, on 13 February 
1942, the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, decided that in view 
of "the deterioration of the situation in the Pacific theatre of war ... the 
continued presence of enemy aliens and persons of Japanese racial 
origin [in the coastal areas] constitutes a serious danger and prejudices 
the effective defence of the Pacific Coast of Canada." 4 9 And as late as 
26 February, the R C N commanding officer on the coast was advised by 
his security intelligence officer that "The removal of all Japanese from 
this coastal area would undoubtedly relieve what is becoming more and 
more a very dangerous situation from the point of view of sabotage and 
aid to the enemy as well as the great danger of development of inter­
racial strife." 5 0 Again, public opinion was given equal weight with the 
fear of sabotage, but it is significant that this advice was proffered after 
adult male Japanese citizens living on the coast had been ordered 
inland. 
Even after the great majority of Japanese Canadians had been 
cleared from the government's designated defence zone, moreover, 
substantial concern was expressed repeatedly by the American military 
and by the US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence on 
26-27 May and 1 September 1942 at the relocation of Japanese 
Canadians inland to road camp sites near railway lines or other 
strategic points. Under pressure, the Canadian government then acted 
to resolve matters to reassure its ally. Similar concerns had been 
expressed in June 1942 in the British Security Coordination report. 5 1 
An additional factor that played an unquantifiable but important part 
in events in BC were the reports that Japanese living in Hawaii, Hong 
Kong and Malaya had helped the attacking Japanese forces. 5 2 
Undoubtedly the lurid tales of fifth column activities from Europe in 
1940 also fed popular fears. The Hawaii stories eventually proved to be 
mere rumours, but their impact was great in the first months of 1942. In 
Hong Kong and particularly in Malaya, however, there was substantial 
truth to the reports in January and February that local Japanese had 
hidden arms and ammunition, planted explosive charges at military 
installations, docks and ships, and sniped at troops, as well as providing 
information to the invaders. 5 3 It is virtually immaterial if the stories 
were true; what is important is that they circulated widely among a 
generally anti-Japanese public and a fearful military that were prepared 
to believe them. As the Vancouver Sun put it on 2 January 1942, "we 
may expect Japanese civilians to do all in their power to assist the 
attacker." 5 4 
Finally, the stories, all too true, of the brutality of the Japanese 
victors towards captured Allied servicemen and civilians had substantial 
impact on both the public and political leaders. As early as 12 February, 
telegrams from London to Ottawa spoke of atrocities against captured 
Hong Kong prisoners and of deplorable conditions in the POW camps. 
Within the week, Cabinet ministers in Ottawa were talking about the 
fate of the Hong Kong force with their intimates, and on 10 March, the 
widespread rumours were given official sanction by statements in 
Parliament in London and Ottawa. The "devilish" Japanese, or so M.J. 
Coldwell of the CCF said in the House of Commons, would be punished 
after the war for their atrocities. The Canadian Japanese, wholly 
innocent of the crimes of the Imperial Japanese Army, nonetheless were 
denied sympathy as a result. 5 5 
Was There a Military Threat to the Coast? 
Whether there was a direct military threat to the coast from the 
Imperial Japanese forces is also worth some consideration, if only 
because the received version denies any. In September 1941, RCAF 
headquarters in Ottawa had been confident that the United States Navy 
was the ultimate guarantor of the safety of the Pacific Coast: "Unless 
the United States Navy is seriously defeated or loses its northern 
bases," Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil told his Minister, C.G. Power, all 
Canada had to do was remain in "watchful readiness" on the West 
Coast. 5 6 With that attitude in the ascendant, the coast of British 
Columbia was left "poorly defended," the words employed to describe 
matters by Robert Rossow, Jr., the American Vice-Consul in Vancou­
ver, in August 1941." After Pearl Harbor, however, the worst possible 
case seemed to have occurred, and Canada was largely unprepared. 
Certainly there were few modern aircraft, few ships and relatively few 
trained soldiers in the area until the outbreak of war, 5 8 and it took some 
time before more could be rushed to the coast. 5 9 That caused concern. 
So too did the course of the war. The Japanese hit Pearl Harbor on 7 
December and simultaneously attacked Malaya, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines and Wake and Midway Islands. On 8 December, Japan 
occupied Thailand, captured Guam on 13 December, Wake on 24 
December, and Hong Kong on 25 December. Manila fell on 2 January, 
Singapore followed on 15 February, a staggering blow to the British 
position in Asia (and something that frightened British Columbia 6 0) and 
the Imperial Japanese Navy crushed an allied fleet in the Java Sea on 
27 February, the date that the Canadian government's decision to move 
all Japanese Canadians inland was in the newspapers. Closer to home, a 
Japanese submarine had shelled Santa Barbara, California on 23 
February, two days later the "Battle of Los Angeles" took place with 
much ammunition expended against (apparently) imaginary targets, 
and there were submarine attacks on points in Oregon. (On 20 June a 
Japanese submarine shelled Estevan point on Vancouver Island.) The 
Dutch East Indies and most of Burma were then captured in March, 
capping an extraordinary four months of conquest. 
At the beginning of June, the Japanese launched what H.P. Willmott, 
the leading historian of Pacific war strategy, called "their main 
endeavour, a twin offensive against the Aleutians," designed to draw the 
American fleet to battle to protect their territory, "and against the 
western Hawaiian Islands," intended to lead to an invasion once the 
Americans' Pacific Fleet had been destroyed. At least two plans for 
such an invasion existed before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
and one plan saw the capture of Hawaii "as preparatory to strikes 
against the United States mainland." 6 1 (Whether attacks against the 
Canadian Coast were intended remains unclear until such Japanese 
military records that survived the war are searched.) Dutch Harbor, 
Alaska was attacked by carrier-based aircraft on 3 June as part of this 
plan. Four days later Kiska and Attu in the Aleutian Islands were 
taken. 
Although in retrospect the American naval victory at Midway in 
June, aided beyond measure by "Magic" intercepts, put an end to the 
Hawaiian adventure and truly marked the beginning of the end for 
Japanese imperial ambitions as a whole, its significance was not quite so 
apparent in mid-1942 as it has since become. Certainly the Canadian 
government did not slacken its defence efforts on the coast after the 
American victory. In mid-February 1942, a military appreciation 
prepared by the chiefs of staff for the minister of national defence's use 
at a secret session of Parliament noted that "probable" Japanese 
strategy included containing "North American forces in America" by 
raids on the North American Pacific seaboard. "Possible" enemy aims 
included an "invasion of the West Coast of North America," although 
the chiefs noted that "Under present conditions" such invasion was "not 
considered to be a practicable operation of war." 6 2 
The next month, with the Japanese forces seemingly roaming at will 
throughout the Pacific and with the politicians anxious to satisfy the 
public clamour for stronger local defences in British Columbia, the chief 
of the General Staff in Ottawa was estimating the possible scale of a 
Japanese attack on the Pacific Coast to be two brigades strong (i.e., two 
Japanese regiments of three battalions each or approximately 5,200 to 
6.000 men), and he was recommending the raising of new forces." At 
the beginning of April, President Roosevelt used the occasion of the first 
meeting of the Pacific Council, made up of representatives of all the 
belligerent allies, to say that he had invited Canada because "he 
thought that Canada might do more than she was now doing."" That 
disturbed Ottawa, perhaps because it mirrored British Columbia public 
opinion so clearly, and Mackenzie King hastened to discuss the matter 
with the president.65 
Later that month, after Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle's B-25 
bombers, launched from the carrier Hornet, had hit Tokyo, Canadian 
intelligence reports predicted that enemy aircraft carriers would launch 
retaliatory attacks against the West Coast in May. 6 6 By June, there 
were nineteen battalions on the coast, a response to Japan's invasion of 
the Aleutians and continued and growing public concern. Even so, the 
military commanders were far from satisfied. The Joint Canadian 
United States Services Committee at Prince Rupert believed that 
military strength in the area was "entirely inadequate against many 
types of attack that are possible and probable from the West."6' The air 
officer commanding on the coast asked for sixteen squadrons to deal 
with the maximum scale of attack by battleships, cruisers and 
carrierborne aircraft. There were also blackouts and dimouts, and active 
plans underway in July and August 1942 for the evacuation of 
Vancouver Island and the lower mainland in the event of a Japanese 
attack.6* 
The Cabinet War Committee was assured by the chief of the General 
Staff in late September that he saw "no reason to fear any invasion 
from the Pacific Coast at present time,"6' but two months later the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the highest Allied military authority, 
determined that while "carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic naval 
bombardment" were the most probable form of attack, the possibility of 
"a small scale destructive raid cannot be ignored." By that, the British 
and American planners meant "a force comprising 10/15 fast merchant 
ships carrying up to two brigades."'0 And as late as March 1943, there 
was a flurry of reports of Japanese activity in North American waters 
that stirred fears about a possible attack of the precise sort the planners 
had anticipated." In other words, and contrary to the arguments of 
those who have argued that there was never any threat from Japan to 
the coast and hence no justification on grounds of national security for 
the evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, there was a credible — if 
limited — military threat into 1943. 
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The intent of this paper was to present some new and re-state some 
old evidence on several aspects of the Japanese-Canadian question. 
What has our account done to the received version? It has pointed to 
the gross weaknesses of and wishful thinking in R C M P and military 
intelligence about the Japanese Canadians. It has demonstrated 
irrefutably that the Japanese Consulate in Vancouver had orders from 
the Foreign Ministry to employ British Columbia Nisei in information 
collection or spying. It has called into question the advice of the military 
planners in Ottawa, brought forward once more the widespread 
concerns of the senior officers and staff planners of all three armed 
forces in British Columbia, and argued that there was a limited but 
credible military threat to North America from early 1942 into 1943 
from the Imperial Japanese forces. It has noted that the attitudes of 
some Japanese Canadians by their support for Japan's war with China 
before 7 December 1941 raised understandable concerns on the part of 
British Columbians and Canadians generally. And although the 
attitudes of Japanese Canadians before and during the war have yet to 
be thoroughly studied despite all the work on the subject, Nakano's 
memoir is important for its account of the wartime attitudes and 
divisions in the community and especially so because of its resonance 
with Stephan's account of Hawaii. Finally, although little has been 
made of this here, it is certainly germane to recall that there was a war 
on and that Canada and its Allies were losing it at the beginning of 
1942. As the civil libertarian and historian Arthur Lower wrote in 
October 1941, "The temper of the Canadian people seems to be 
becoming more and more arbitrary and we are fast losing whatever 
tolerance and magnanimity we once possessed." 7 2 That explains much 
that happened. 
None of this alters the conclusion that the Japanese Canadians were 
victims of the racism of the society in which they lived and an uncaring 
government that failed to defend the ideals for which its leaders claimed 
to have taken Canada and Canadians to war. Even so, this paper does 
maintain that there were military and intelligence concerns that, in the 
face of the sudden attack at Pearl Harbor, could have provided Ottawa 
with a justification for the evacuation of the Japanese Canadians from 
the coast. The government in December 1941 was unaware of much of 
the data that has since emerged, and even if it had had it all, it simply 
lacked the assessment capability to put it together. If it had had the 
information and the intelligence capacity to appraise it properly, the 
arguments for evacuation would certainly have appeared far stronger 
than they already did. 
However arguable this case, there is, of course, no necessary 
connection between the later confiscation of property and the still later 
effort to deport the Japanese Canadians and the reasons for the 
evacuation that seemed compelling to some in January and February 
1942. The anger that persists at the evacuation might be misplaced; that 
at the confiscation of property and the attempt at deportation still seems 
wholly justifiable. In any case, this paper should demonstrate that there 
remains ample room for further work, broader interpretations and, 
perhaps, a changed emphasis in this area of research. 
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